09-12-19 What is a Ronald George system?

Ronald George Systems are large database management systems in US and state government agencies, including, but not limited to courts and correctional facilities (jails and prisons) and in public corporations, including, but not limited to financial institutions, which were introduced in the past quarter century with no publicly accountable validation (no certified functional logic verification) and were part of large-scale fraud on the American people. 

Ronald M George is the current Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of California.  Around 1985, according to his official biography he served in leadership positions at the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles.  At that time, Sustain - a case management system - was installed at the latter court, which was an early example of such fraud on the people. To this date, Chief Justice Ronald George denied repeated requests for comments and explanation for his role, if any, in the installation of Sustain at the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles.  The system includes various features, which must be deemed fraud by design and fraud in operation.  The simplest one to explain was the feature that allowed running full cases as if they were litigated under the jurisdiction of the California Superior Court, when if fact they never were.  

Examples of such cases included, but were not limited to: (a) Galdjie v Darwish (SC052737),  (b) Marina v LA County (BS109420), and (c) Sturgeon v LA County (BC351286).  The first was an example of how the system was employed to deprive a person of property, the second how it was employed to deprive a person of liberty, and the third how it was employed to deprive all 10 million residents of LA county of the prospect of honest court services in years to come. In all three cases, the Presiding Judge and Clerk of the Court denied repeated requests to certify the cases as matters that were in fact litigated under the jurisdiction of the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles. They denied repeated requests to certify the respective judges as duly assigned to such matters, and the respective judgments as judgments of the Superior Court of California. It was alleged that such vague and ambiguous conditions could never have emerged had it not been for the installation of the CMSs at the LA Court and the manner in which they have been operated ever since.

Beyond Sustain, other noted examples of Ronald George Systems included, but were not limited to:

1. Inmate Information Center of the Sheriff's Department, County of Los Angeles.  It allowed the listing online of inmates, as if they were arrested and booked in compliance with the fundamentals of the law, when in fact - there were no records to support the arrest and booking of such inmates. Such inmates were in fact held as fraudulently imprisoned, "off the record" and "off the inmate count".  The prime example was in the arrest and booking of Richard Fine. It was listed as if it took place on March 4, 2009, at the Municipal Court of San Pedro. In fact, no such agency existed since around 2002. Moreover, the Sheriff's Department fraudulently claimed that the missing arrest and booking papers were held by such non-existent agency.
2. PACER & CM/ECF - the dual docketing system installed in the 2000s in US Courts across the country, which allowed the same type of fraud that was allowed in Sustain in the past quarter century. The key fraudulent feature in these systems were the NEFs, which provided the authentication of court records as honest, valid, and effectual, and such which should be given "full faith and credit".  The NEFs were implemented in a manner that allowed only authorized attorneys access to such records, while access to the public was denied, in what must be deemed violation of US Supreme Court decision in Nixon v Warner Communications, Inc (1978).  Furthermore, many US Courts implemented features where email notices containing the NEFs would be automatically eliminated at the end of 30 or 60 days.  It was claimed that there could not possibly be an honest explanation for such features implemented in the dual systems of PACER & CM/ECF, and that the implementation of such systems was with no authority at all.
3. EDGE - the underwriting monitoring system at Countrywide/Bank of America, which allowed fraud in underwriting of residential loans, and which led to losses to US Taxpayers in the hundreds of billions of dollars.
4. SEC, Office of Thrift Supervision, Office of Trade Commission - complaints logging systems of US banking regulators. Evidence demonstrated that the systems allowed operators to eliminate complaints against Countrywide, which were filed prior to the publication and wide recognition of the current financial/integrity crisis.  Therefore, such agencies informed US Congress that there had no data to warn them in advance of the pending crisis.
5. California Commission on Teachers’ Credentialing - the data base of the California Department of Education related agency, which purported to keep honest records of California teachers credentialing.

The examples above demonstrated the wide range of applications where Ronald George Systems were implemented to defraud the American people. It was alleged that the fundamental failure of the US government to establish process and procedures for validation of such systems prior to their implementation was a material deficiency, which must be immediately addressed by US Congress through new legislation.

It was further claimed the failure to take action to validate such systems posed unreasonable risks to US and international financial markets, in violation of the Basel Accords, which the US claimed to be a good faith party to.

It was further alleged that case management systems at the courts were a notable exception, where existing law was sufficient to allow enforcement -through promulgation of the federal and states rule making enabling act. All case management systems at the courts must, by definition be deemed as local rules of courts, since any computer system was an assembly of assertions - or a collection of rules of operations, and therefore - a case management system of a court  - was in fact a collection of rules of operation of the local court.

See also related item: Kozinski Fraud.


I. CC

• Prof Richard Posner, University of Chicago Law School - as a request for the initiation of corrective actions.
• Law school faculty
• James C Duff, Director, Administrative Office of the US Courts
• Glenn A Fine, Inspector General, US Dept of Justice - as an addendum to complaint about wide-spread corruption of the justice system in Los Angeles County, and refusal of FBI and U.S. DOJ senior officers to accord Equal Protection, providing instead fraudulent responses to inquiries by U.S. Congress.
• Other Inspector Generals - as an addendum to complaints about widespread corruption in Los Angeles County, and refusal of US government to enforce the law.
• Mark J. Sullivan, Director, US Secret Service: As a request for investigation, pursuant to the US Secret Service mission statement and primary investigational jurisdiction - in safeguarding the integrity of the financial system - particularly - large computer systems.
• NavanNaethem Pillay, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
• Nout Wellink, Chair, Basel Accords Committee
• Lee Baca, Los Angeles Sheriff, as a repeat request to access the warrants of RF and NR1 - to inspect and to copy.

II. The Usual

IN SHORT - KOZINSKI MUST RESIGN!

"This case should demonstrate that the FBI will pursue all allegations of judicial corruption vigorously, as public corruption violations are among the most serious of all criminal conduct and can tear at the fabric of a democratic society," said John F. Pikus, special agent in charge of the Albany division, in a prepared statement.