Appendix 34: Judge Hila Gurevitz – Reckless Mendacity and her Attitude towards Unrepresented Litigants
https://inproperinla.blogspot.com/2026/07/appendix-34-judge-hila-gurevitz.html
Index
of Appendices and Biosketch, Joseph Zernik, PhD, LLB
https://inproperinla.blogspot.com/2026/07/appeal-for-review-of-rachel-ben-aris.html
Rachel
Ben-Ari's competence as General Counsel - Appeal Filed with
Prof.
Uri Sivan, Technion
President,
and Prof. Daniel Chamovitz, Chair of VERA and Ben Gurion University
President
https://inproperinla.blogspot.com/2026/07/2026-07-17-technion-israel-institute-of.html
On September 11, 2024, Judge Gurevitz published her first "full-form" decision (in contrast with "post-it" decisions) in EF 11650-06-24. It is a decision on a request to summarily dismiss the case, for failing to file and serve a
summons.
The decision is of the style the Prof. Daphna Hacker calls in academic papers, "extreme activism"
among Family judges in Israel. In a leaked correspondence with a group
of colleagues, she called the Family Courts "a jungle," and described
judges arbitrarily ruling with no relationship to the law of the land.
But neither here, nor there would she admit the plain truth before our eyes: Judicial corruption. Because corruption is not necessarily bribes. Corruption is also Deceit and Breech of Trust. And when a judge routinely rules in disregard of the law and in violation of his oath as a judge, it should be treated as Deceit and Breech of Trust.
This
decision also served me as a litmus test. I let attorneys (particularly
some that I had considered friends) read it. I then asked for their
impression, if they noticed something odd about it. Not at all...
This
one was the first record on which Gurevitz went public with the
deception of renaming me "Plaintiff". In some parts of the writing its
ambivalent, but then you get to a sentence like this one:
Translation
"It is important to note in this context that the Applicant is
unrepresented, and therefore, presumably, misinterprets the question of
the court's authority. A summons is intended for the defendant,
not the plaintiff. It is clear that Respondent 1, having
turned to the court, submits to the authority of the court to which he
applied. The word "authority" in the regulations pertains to
the question of whether the court has jurisdiction or not."
חשוב
לציין בהקשר זה כי המבקש אינו מיוצג ועל-כן, ככל הנראה, הוא מפרש מפנה
לשאלת מרות בית משפט. הזמנה לדין מיועדת לנתבע ולא לתובע. ברור כי משיב
1, אם פנה לבית המשפט, מקבל עליו את מרות בית המשפט אליו פנה. המילה
"מרות" בתקנות נוגעת לשאלת סמכות בית משפט, אם לאו.
In Gurevitz's decision, sentences like the two above, were likely the first time that she was recorded in this case, resorting to her reckless mendacity, lying and having
fun at it...
In
a disqualification for a cause, a couple of month later, I noted her habit of designating me
"Plaintiff". I also claimed it was defamatory... presenting me as a person who would file a complaint in the Israeli family court...
Her
response in the December 1, 2024 full form decision was adding a lie upon a lie: She stated that my comment stems
from not being a lawyer. I don't understand that party's designation
changes with the role it takes in a given motion. Her response was
another example of her reckless mendacity. There is no doubt that she
knows the basic Civil Procedure Regulations. Her response was contrary
to the specific instructions, which were published with the new Civil
Procedure Regulations, 2018. Party designations must remain constant, as
they appeared in the initial pleading, likewise their order in the
heading of the paper. However it is allowed to ADD a designation
addressing the party's role in a given motion.
Her
reckless mendacity speaks volumes about the corrupting effect of
impunity. It is also crystal clear that she had discussed my case with
the court of appeals, in fact her best friend, Esperanza Alon, who I
claim is the progenitor of this affair, is permanently assigned to the
3-judge panel of any potential appeal by me.
Family Court in Haifa 11650-06-24 Z. v. Z. et al
Application No.: 15
Before: The Honorable Judge Hila Gurevitz Ovadia
In the matter of: Estate of the late R. Z., ID -------
The Applicant:
Y. Z., ID -------
v.
The Respondents:
1. A. Z., ID -------
Rep. by Counsel, Atty. Yoav Salomon
2. D. Z., ID -------
Rep. by Counsel, Atty. Rachel Ben-Ari (Bar Bar-Hai)
Legislation cited:
Civil Procedure Regulations, 5779-2018: Regulations 1, 2, 3, 4, 5(a), 10(13), 158(a)
Family Court Regulations (Procedure), 5781-2020: Regulation 11(a)
DECISION
The Applicant filed a motion for summary dismissal. I have found fit to dismiss it without requesting a response.
The
Applicant’s claims regarding the fact that the initial pleading was
served without a summons—even if there is merit to them (which has not
yet been proven)—do not constitute a defect that goes to the root of the
proceeding, nor a defect that prejudiced a substantive or procedural
right of the Applicant. The deadline for submitting the Applicant's
response was set, and even extended upon his request. There is also no
dispute that the Applicant is aware of the proceeding. Given these
circumstances, the two purposes that a summons is intended to fulfill
have been achieved: a deadline was set to submit a response, and the
parties are aware of the proceeding.
It is also clear that this is not a situation where Respondent 1 does not submit to the court's authority.
For
the sake of clarification, the Applicant in his motion refers to
Regulation 158(a) of the Civil Procedure Regulations, 5779-2018, as well
as to Regulation 10(13) of the Civil Procedure Regulations, 5779-2018,
which stipulate that the statement of claim shall include a summons in
its first part, unless the defendant is represented. It was argued that
Regulation 11(a) of the Family Court Regulations (Procedure), 5781-2020
does not permit an exception to the summons requirement—meaning there is
an obligation to attach a summons in actions filed in the Family Court.
It was claimed that in the case at hand, no summonses were attached,
and therefore the court did not acquire jurisdiction over Respondent 1.
It
is important to note in this context that the Applicant is
unrepresented, and therefore, presumably, misinterprets the question of
the court's authority. A summons is intended for the defendant, not the
plaintiff. It is clear that Respondent 1, having turned to the court,
submits to the authority of the court to which he applied. The word
"authority" in the regulations pertains to the question of whether the
court has jurisdiction or not.
To
the above it should be added that the Applicant is connected to the
"Net HaMishpat" system, viewed the filed pleading less than 48 hours
after its submission, and has also filed several
motions/responses/notices to date—such that the rule of actual knowledge
has been satisfied.
It
should further be added that the Family Court has the authority to
deviate from procedural rules whenever necessary for the sake of
justice. Under the circumstances here, where the matter involves the
implementation of an estate distribution agreement, and all three
beneficiaries who are parties to the proceeding agree that an estate
administrator needs to be appointed for this reason, with the dispute
being the identity of the estate administrator—striking the claim would
not only fail to advance a resolution to the conflict, but would
complicate, prolong, and cause unnecessary expenses to the parties.
Therefore, I do not believe that the alleged defect warrants striking the action.
Regarding costs:
At the margin of this decision, I refer to Regulations 1 through 5(a)
of the Civil Procedure Regulations, 5779-2018. Pursuant to these
regulations, the court must act to ascertain the truth in a proper and
fair judicial proceeding within a reasonable time; litigants are
obligated to act in good faith and with procedural fairness in order to
assist the court in fulfilling the procedural purpose, focusing the
issues in dispute, and avoiding abuse of the judicial process. With
requisite caution, I am of the opinion that the motion filed tends to
delay, harass, or constitute an abuse of the judicial process, contrary
to the provisions of Regulation 4 of the Civil Procedure Regulations,
5779-2018.
The
meaning of this is that there is, ostensibly, cause to order the
Applicant to pay costs to the State Treasury. Ex gratia, and also given
that no response was requested—although there may have been room to do
so—there is no order for costs. However, taking into account the conduct
in the proceeding thus far, as reflected in the
motions/responses/notices filed, I find it appropriate to note that
later in the proceeding, if I perceive that the Applicant conducts
himself in a manner that complicates, delays, or postpones the
adjudication of the matter, I will not hesitate to do so.
On the merits of the action, namely the question of the identity of the estate administrator, a hearing is scheduled for October 09, 2024, at 10:00 AM.
The Secretariat shall serve this to the parties and close the motion.
Permitted for publication with the omission of identifying details and following proofreading and editing revisions.
Given today, 8th of Elul 5784, September 11, 2024, in the absence of the parties=.
Hila Gurevitz Ovadia, Judge
.
Copied below is the motion requesting explanations on "errors" in Judge Gurevitz's December 1, 2024 Decision, denying disqualification for a cause.
.