Appendix 34: Judge Hila Gurevitz – Reckless Mendacity and her Attitude towards Unrepresented Litigants

Appendix 34: Judge Hila Gurevitz – Reckless Mendacity and her Attitude towards Unrepresented Litigants

https://inproperinla.blogspot.com/2026/07/appendix-34-judge-hila-gurevitz.html 

Index of Appendices and Biosketch, Joseph Zernik, PhD, LLB

https://inproperinla.blogspot.com/2026/07/appeal-for-review-of-rachel-ben-aris.html

Rachel Ben-Ari's competence as General Counsel - Appeal Filed with Prof. Uri Sivan, Technion President, and Prof. Daniel Chamovitz, Chair of VERA and Ben Gurion University President

https://inproperinla.blogspot.com/2026/07/2026-07-17-technion-israel-institute-of.html

On September 11, 2024, Judge Gurevitz published her first "full-form" decision (in contrast with "post-it" decisions) in EF 11650-06-24. It is a decision on a request to summarily dismiss the case, for failing to file and serve a summons.

The decision is of the style the Prof. Daphna Hacker calls in academic papers, "extreme activism" among Family judges in Israel. In a leaked correspondence with a group of colleagues, she called the Family Courts "a jungle," and described judges arbitrarily ruling with no relationship to the law of the land. 

But neither here, nor there would she admit the plain truth before our eyes: Judicial corruption. Because corruption is not necessarily bribes. Corruption is also Deceit and Breech of Trust. And when a judge routinely rules in disregard of the law and in violation of his oath as a judge, it should be treated as Deceit and Breech of Trust.

This decision also served me as a litmus test. I let attorneys (particularly some that I had considered friends) read it. I then asked for their impression, if they noticed something odd about it. Not at all...

This one was the first record on which Gurevitz went public with the deception of renaming me "Plaintiff". In some parts of the writing its ambivalent, but then you get to a sentence like this one:

Translation 

"It is important to note in this context that the Applicant is unrepresented, and therefore, presumably, misinterprets the question of the court's authority. A summons is intended for the defendant, not the plaintiff. It is clear that Respondent 1, having turned to the court, submits to the authority of the court to which he applied. The word "authority" in the regulations pertains to the question of whether the court has jurisdiction or not." 

 חשוב לציין בהקשר זה כי המבקש אינו מיוצג ועל-כן, ככל הנראה, הוא מפרש מפנה לשאלת מרות בית משפט.  הזמנה לדין מיועדת לנתבע ולא לתובע. ברור כי משיב 1,  אם פנה לבית המשפט, מקבל עליו את מרות בית המשפט אליו פנה. המילה "מרות" בתקנות נוגעת לשאלת סמכות בית משפט, אם לאו.

In Gurevitz's decision, sentences like the two above, were likely the first time that she was recorded in this case, resorting to her reckless mendacity, lying and having fun at it...  

In a disqualification for a cause, a couple of month later, I noted her habit of designating me "Plaintiff".  I also claimed it was defamatory... presenting me as a person who would file a complaint in the Israeli family court...

Her response in the December 1, 2024 full form decision was adding a lie upon a lie: She stated that my comment stems from not being a lawyer. I don't understand that party's designation changes with the role it takes in a given motion. Her response was another example of her reckless mendacity. There is no doubt that she knows the basic Civil Procedure Regulations. Her response  was contrary to the specific instructions, which were published with the new Civil Procedure Regulations, 2018. Party designations must remain constant, as they appeared in the initial pleading, likewise their order in the heading of the paper. However it is allowed to ADD a designation addressing the party's role in a given motion.

Her reckless mendacity speaks volumes about the corrupting effect of impunity. It is also crystal clear that she had discussed my case with the court of appeals, in fact her best friend, Esperanza Alon, who I claim is the progenitor of this affair, is permanently assigned to the 3-judge panel of any potential appeal by me.

 

Family Court in Haifa                        11650-06-24 Z. v. Z. et al

Application No.: 15

Before: The Honorable Judge Hila Gurevitz Ovadia

In the matter of: Estate of the late R. Z., ID -------

The Applicant:

Y. Z., ID -------

         v.

The Respondents:

1. A. Z., ID -------

Rep. by Counsel, Atty. Yoav Salomon

2. D. Z., ID -------

Rep. by Counsel, Atty. Rachel Ben-Ari (Bar Bar-Hai)

Legislation cited:

Civil Procedure Regulations, 5779-2018: Regulations 1, 2, 3, 4, 5(a), 10(13), 158(a)

Family Court Regulations (Procedure), 5781-2020: Regulation 11(a)

DECISION

The Applicant filed a motion for summary dismissal. I have found fit to dismiss it without requesting a response.

The Applicant’s claims regarding the fact that the initial pleading was served without a summons—even if there is merit to them (which has not yet been proven)—do not constitute a defect that goes to the root of the proceeding, nor a defect that prejudiced a substantive or procedural right of the Applicant. The deadline for submitting the Applicant's response was set, and even extended upon his request. There is also no dispute that the Applicant is aware of the proceeding. Given these circumstances, the two purposes that a summons is intended to fulfill have been achieved: a deadline was set to submit a response, and the parties are aware of the proceeding.

It is also clear that this is not a situation where Respondent 1 does not submit to the court's authority.

For the sake of clarification, the Applicant in his motion refers to Regulation 158(a) of the Civil Procedure Regulations, 5779-2018, as well as to Regulation 10(13) of the Civil Procedure Regulations, 5779-2018, which stipulate that the statement of claim shall include a summons in its first part, unless the defendant is represented. It was argued that Regulation 11(a) of the Family Court Regulations (Procedure), 5781-2020 does not permit an exception to the summons requirement—meaning there is an obligation to attach a summons in actions filed in the Family Court. It was claimed that in the case at hand, no summonses were attached, and therefore the court did not acquire jurisdiction over Respondent 1.

It is important to note in this context that the Applicant is unrepresented, and therefore, presumably, misinterprets the question of the court's authority. A summons is intended for the defendant, not the plaintiff. It is clear that Respondent 1, having turned to the court, submits to the authority of the court to which he applied. The word "authority" in the regulations pertains to the question of whether the court has jurisdiction or not.

To the above it should be added that the Applicant is connected to the "Net HaMishpat" system, viewed the filed pleading less than 48 hours after its submission, and has also filed several motions/responses/notices to date—such that the rule of actual knowledge has been satisfied.

It should further be added that the Family Court has the authority to deviate from procedural rules whenever necessary for the sake of justice. Under the circumstances here, where the matter involves the implementation of an estate distribution agreement, and all three beneficiaries who are parties to the proceeding agree that an estate administrator needs to be appointed for this reason, with the dispute being the identity of the estate administrator—striking the claim would not only fail to advance a resolution to the conflict, but would complicate, prolong, and cause unnecessary expenses to the parties.

Therefore, I do not believe that the alleged defect warrants striking the action.

Regarding costs: At the margin of this decision, I refer to Regulations 1 through 5(a) of the Civil Procedure Regulations, 5779-2018. Pursuant to these regulations, the court must act to ascertain the truth in a proper and fair judicial proceeding within a reasonable time; litigants are obligated to act in good faith and with procedural fairness in order to assist the court in fulfilling the procedural purpose, focusing the issues in dispute, and avoiding abuse of the judicial process. With requisite caution, I am of the opinion that the motion filed tends to delay, harass, or constitute an abuse of the judicial process, contrary to the provisions of Regulation 4 of the Civil Procedure Regulations, 5779-2018.

The meaning of this is that there is, ostensibly, cause to order the Applicant to pay costs to the State Treasury. Ex gratia, and also given that no response was requested—although there may have been room to do so—there is no order for costs. However, taking into account the conduct in the proceeding thus far, as reflected in the motions/responses/notices filed, I find it appropriate to note that later in the proceeding, if I perceive that the Applicant conducts himself in a manner that complicates, delays, or postpones the adjudication of the matter, I will not hesitate to do so.

On the merits of the action, namely the question of the identity of the estate administrator, a hearing is scheduled for October 09, 2024, at 10:00 AM.

The Secretariat shall serve this to the parties and close the motion.

Permitted for publication with the omission of identifying details and following proofreading and editing revisions.

Given today, 8th of Elul 5784, September 11, 2024, in the absence of the parties=.

Hila Gurevitz Ovadia, Judge

 

.

 

Copied below is the motion requesting explanations on "errors" in Judge Gurevitz's December 1, 2024 Decision, denying disqualification for a cause.